The first conference to examine the Mine Ban Treaty (the Nairobi Summit) took place at the end of 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya. On this occasion, a review of the last five years, in terms of the application by the State parties of the measures included in the Treaty was drawn up and an action plan for the next five years was adopted. This called for State parties to accede to the Treaty, to destroy their stockpiles without delay and to exchange information with total transparency.

 Although the amendments* to the action plan, proposed by the International Campaign and the International Committee of the Red Cross (CICR) were not accepted, both organizations are convinced that this is an excellent action plan. Indeed it obliges governments to commit to a series of concrete measures thus providing them with a solid framework in which they can continue to advance the implementation of the treaty and particularly the parts concerning mine victim assistance. Handicap International and the International Campaign will however continue to lobby for continued discussions on articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty which raise several unanswered questions:

 Article 1: The definition of acts permitted by the Treaty

 Unanswered question: joint operations with Non-State parties The International Campaign and the CICR have on numerous occasions raised the question of the potential participation of State parties in joint military operations with Non-State parties using antipersonnel landmines. Such operations contravene article 1 of the Treaty which states that a State party is bound to "never, under any circumstances [...] assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity banned prohibited to a State party...”

 _{[The amendment* to the action plan is intended to clarify the activities prohibited by the Treaty, notably by detailing the State parties refusal to participate in joint operations involving the use of landmines and the control mechanisms to be put in place  so that no non-signatory State uses antipersonnel landmines during these operations.]}

Article 2: The definition of antipersonnel landmines

  Unanswered question: anti-vehicle mines with sensitive fuses. In Article 2 the Treaty defines “anti-personnel landmines” as “mines designed to be exploded by the presence, contact or close proximity of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. However, some anti-tank or anti-vehicle mines can be triggered by a person: either their detonation can be triggered by pressure under 150kg, or by sensitive fuses such as tripwire, breakwire, tilt rod or other low pressure fuses.

They therefore constitute an antipersonnel threat, as well as an anti-tank or anti-vehicle threat and are incompatible with both the spirit and the letter of the Treaty.

 _{[The amendment* to the action plan seeks to integrate into the Treaty's field of application anti-tank mines which, without being designed as anti-personnel mines, can have a similar impact].}

Article 3: The retention of mines for training and research purposes

 Unanswered question: the number of mines retained. According to Article 3 of the Treaty “the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted.  The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes”.

_{[The amendment* to the action plan seeks to adopt a more detailed text which stipulates “that the number of mines retained, if any at all, will be the strict minimum and will number in the hundred and thousands or less but not in the tens of thousands”, thus preventing States from creating a militarily operational stockpile].}